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Summary
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions which are
principal elements of U.S. defense capabilities include a wide variety of systems for
acquiring and processing information needed by national security decisionmakers and
military commanders. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting
satellites.  Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products;
others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems.  Some are
“national” systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to
Washington-area agencies; others are “tactical” systems intended to support military
commanders on the battlefield.  Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S.
intelligence spending that, according to media estimates, amounts to some $40 billion
annually.  This report provides a description of ISR budgeting and management
issues and serves as background for consideration of efforts to reassess current
arrangements.  It will be updated if circumstances warrant.
Congress has increasingly expressed concern about the costs and management
of ISR programs.  With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition is coordinated by the
Defense Department and the Intelligence Community.  Although there are long-
existing staff mechanisms for reviewing and coordinating ISR programs in the
context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congress believe that existing
procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps in
coverage.  Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new
generation of reconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of
information and serve similar customers, but they are acquired in distinctly different
ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have been beset by increasing
costs and schedule delays.  
Reflecting congressional concerns about the efficacy of current procedures,
recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require
that the Defense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and
integration of ISR capabilities over the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if
developed, could potentially ensure more comprehensive coverage of targets and save
considerable sums of money.  Some critics — including the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), however, go
further, arguing that current ISR problems can only be resolved by a major
reorganization of the Intelligence Community.  The 9/11 Commission specifically
recommends that a new position of Director of National Intelligence be established
to manage the national intelligence program (but not joint military and tactical
intelligence programs which would managed solely by the Defense Department).
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1 ISR as used in Defense Department documents refers to the sets of collection and
processing systems, and associated operations, involved in acquiring and analyzing
information about foreign countries.  Intelligence is a more general term; surveillance refers
to systematic observation of a targeted area or group, usually over an extended time;
reconnaissance refers to an effort or a mission to acquire information about a target and can
mean a one-time endeavor. See U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001.  As
used in this Report, the term “intelligence systems” encompasses all ISR systems.
2 The intelligence programs of the State, Justice (including the FBI), Energy, and Treasury
Departments have far fewer budgetary implications and will not be addressed herein.  Many
of the efforts of the Coast Guard, now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),






The various systems that collect, process, and disseminate intelligence are
encompassed in the budget category known as Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR1).  ISR covers a multitude of programs ranging from billion-
dollar satellites to hand-held cameras.  The bulk of funding is for research and
development (R&D) and procurement; personnel costs are comparatively low.  Some
systems are used only by military units; others are national systems operated by
Washington-level defense agencies.  Most are surrounded in secrecy, but total
spending on ISR, while difficult to estimate with unclassified information,
undoubtedly runs into the tens of billions of dollars.  The ISR programs considered
in this report are managed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and by the large
intelligence agencies and components of the Department of Defense (DOD).2
ISR acquisition has in recent years come under strong criticism.  Reportedly,
there are technical problems with the new generation of reconnaissance satellites,
along with billion dollar cost-overruns; only a small number of the planned high-
altitude UAVs are actually deployed; and there have been difficulties in ensuring that
the troops who need intelligence acquire it in a timely manner.  There is a widespread
awareness that ISR spending, much greater than in past years, could easily absorb
even larger portions of defense and intelligence budgets, making the need for
tradeoffs even more important.  Some observers point to the possibility that satellites
and UAVs potentially undertake the same or similar missions, but that the current
system gives little opportunity for cost comparisons or trade-offs to be made in the
CRS-2
3 U.S. Congress, 104th Congress, 1st session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996 for the Intelligence Activities of the United
States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System,
S.Rept. 104-97, June 14, 1995, p. 4.
4 U.S. Congress, 104th Congress, 2d session, Committee of Conference, Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H.Rept. 104-832, September 24, 1996, p. 38.
5 There are three types of intelligence programs; NFIP includes the national programs that
support senior policymakers; the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) that provides
(continued...)
acquisition process. See Appendix A for a case study of the trade-offs between
satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Understanding the procedures for acquiring ISR systems is, however,
complicated by the fact that different ISR systems are acquired in entirely different
ways, by different intelligence agencies or military services, and are designed for
different users.  In addition, the acquisition processes are overseen by different
congressional committees.  It is difficult to ensure efficient acquisition in the separate
programs which are often based on innovative technologies.  It is even more
challenging to envision a seamless and comprehensive system of systems and to
ensure the acquisition of an optimal mix of specific systems.  
Congressional Concerns with ISR:  Lack of
Coordination
Although procedures for coordinating the budgeting of ISR programs have long
been in place, over the last few years it is apparent that some Members of Congress
have concluded that the procedures have not been wholly effective. There has been,
it is argued, inadequate data to compare systems capabilities and costs across the
spectrum of intelligence programs, an imbalance between collection and analysis
programs, and an intelligence effort that does not reflect an optimal allocation of
extensive resources.  Expressions of congressional concern go back a number of
years.  In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) expressed its
misgivings about existing cooperation among agencies and recommended a joint
review by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense to ensure that “both Intelligence Community and Defense Department
equities are served in the planning, programming, and management of all intelligence
activities and programs.”3 
Some believe that giving the DCI greater management responsibilities would
improve the management of ISR programs, including those in the Department of
Defense (DOD).  Reflecting that view, the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act
(P.L. 104-293) included provisions that strengthened the ability of the DCI “to
manage the Intelligence Community by codifying his authority to participate in the
development of the budgets for defense-wide and tactical intelligence....”4  The
Conference Committee stated: “Giving the DCI a database of all intelligence
activities and requiring all National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) elements5
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5 (...continued)
support to officials throughout DOD; and Tactical Intelligence and Related Programs
(TIARA) that are designed to support a single military service.  For further background, see
below, pp. 11-14.
6 Ibid., p. 39.
7 S.Rept. 106-279, p. 33.
8 S.Rept. 107-63, p. 17.
9 U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, To
Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related
Activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 107-149, May 9,
2002, p. 28.
to submit periodic budget execution reports should enable the DCI to make better use
of his existing authorities — given to him by Congress in 1992 — to approve the
budgets of NFIP elements and to transfer funds and personnel with the concurrence
of affected agency heads.  The conferees in considering the FY1997 legislation urged
the DCI to be more assertive in using these authorities.”6
In May 2000, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that, “the budget
practices of the [Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)] and the Intelligence Community
as a whole are simply inadequate to address current requirements. Upper level
program managers lack sufficient insight into the process to make informed and
timely decisions regarding the allocation of funds, and to assure Congress, and
themselves, that funds are being spent as appropriated and authorized.”7
The next year the committee again argued that the Intelligence Community “is
handicapped by the lack of comprehensive strategic and performance plans that can
be used to articulate program goals, measure program performance, improve program
efficiency and aid in resource planning.”  Accordingly, the Committee directed the
DCI to produce a “comprehensive Intelligence Community strategic plan and
performance plan, as well as complementary strategic and performance plans for the
intelligence agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program aggregation.”
The Committee asked that such plans be undertaken annually and made available to
congressional committees by March 1 of each year.8 
 
In 2002 the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledged receipt of the “first-
ever plans coordinated across the Intelligence Community aimed at establishing
performance measures aligned with the stated goals and priorities of the Director of
Central Intelligence.”  The Committee went on, however, to indicate that further
work is needed and suggested that developing new systems merely to acquire a new
capability was insufficient; the capability had to meet validated intelligence needs.
“A key issue is the development of performance plans and measures that are not
focused solely on the attainment of intelligence capabilities but also on the value
received from such capabilities in pursuit of Intelligence Community missions.”9  
Despite this admonition, the next year the Committee called attention to the
absence of a 2003 performance plan submission, even though the deadline had passed
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10 S.Rept. 108-44, p. 12
11 Furthermore, the Committee complained that the National Security Agency (NSA), a
major intelligence agency,  had been unable to provide basic information about its
acquisition efforts:
It is very difficult for the Committee to understand what needs to be done
to modernize NSA when NSA cannot provide an adequate baseline of ongoing
development and acquisition programs, projects, and activities....  
The Committee has fenced funds over the past two fiscal years to try to bring command
attention to this problem.  Submission to date have shown progress, but are not
comprehensive in identifying known projects and programs that are being funded in the
CCP....  Future funding requests will be balanced against the NSA acquisition baseline so
it is in the agency’s best interest to get this done right, and soon. U.S. Congress, 108th
Congress, 1st session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 2004 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 108-44, May 8, 2003, p. 13.
12 Ibid., p. 7. 
with no request for an extension.10  More significantly, the Committee noted that it
is aware
of no capability within DoD or the Intelligence Community for objectively,
independently, and comprehensively evaluating alternative sensor and platform
architecture and capabilities.  There are some capabilities within different
agencies and departments, but none that are available, independent of the
program offices, to model and assess cross-program trades without regard to the
location of the sensor or platform (air, space, land, or sea) or the level of
compartmentation.  Consequently, although DoD and Intelligence Community
officials expend substantial effort and time evaluating programs trades, they do
so without the benefit of the rigorous quantitative modeling necessary to
optimize collection capabilities and architectures.  Given the vast sums involved
in these programs, even modest increases in the efficiency of resources allocation
could lead to substantial benefits.  Further, the Committee notes that the national
military strategy, as well as the Defense Planning Guidance, have been
developed in recent years without the participation of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his staff, notwithstanding the growing importance of intelligence
to military operations and the need to build forces commensurate to validated
threats.11
Section 355 of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act  (P.L. 108-177) requires
a report from the DCI and the Secretary of Defense assessing progress in the
development of “a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the
utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities
for the collection of intelligence ... [and] the improvement of coordination between
the Department [of Defense] and the intelligence community on strategic and
budgetary planning.12  
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13 The accompanying committee report noted that the U.S. has “ the most capable ISR
system in the world” but “as good as this system is, however, it is often plagued by gaps,
competition for assets, unavailability at the required level, and parallel systems (so-called
‘stovepipes’) that do not fully complement one another.... the Department has continued to
develop some capabilities without regard to their place within an overarching ISR
architecture.” U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 1st session, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, S.Rept. 108-46, May
13, 2003, p. 355.
14 Section 923, P.L. 108-136.
In separate legislation, Congress has also urged that DOD take a greater role in
managing ISR; in section 923 of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-
136) Congress found that:
... there is not currently a well-defined forum through which the integrators of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for each of the Armed
Forces can routinely interact with each other and with senior representatives of
Department of Defense intelligence agencies, as well as with other members of
the intelligence community, to ensure unity of effort and to preclude unnecessary
duplication of effort.13
P.L. 108-136 further stated that the existing structure of intelligence programming
may not be the best approach for supporting the development of an intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance structure that is integrated to meet the national
security requirements of the United States in the 21st century.
Accordingly, the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act directed the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence to establish an “ISR Integration Council” to provide a
permanent forum for assessing ISR capabilities.  The council is to consist of senior
intelligence officers of the services, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff,
and the directors of DOD intelligence agencies.  The DCI would be “invited” to
participate.  The council would be charged with developing a comprehensive
roadmap “to guide the development and integration” of DOD ISR capabilities for 15
years.14
In addition to its general concerns about ISR programs, some Members of
Congress have specifically focused on two issues related to budget processes that
they argued undermine their abilities to conduct oversight of ISR efforts.  They argue
that congressional budget justification books have been inadequate, and that there has
been an over-reliance on supplemental appropriations to fund continuing ISR
programs.
Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) 
Effective congressional oversight depends on accurate, consistent information
over a multi-year period; the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI), in particular, has criticized the inadequacy of intelligence budget
justification materials and asked for more complete budgetary submissions in the
form of congressional budget justification books .  Proposals for ISR programs are
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15 U.S. Congress, 105th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, H.Rept.
105-135, Part 1, June 18, 1997, p. 64.  The subsequent Conference Report noted that the
CMS was then in the process of revising the structure of the CBJBs and deferred the
provision pending the outcome of CMS efforts; see U.S. Congress, 105th Congress, 1st
session, Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
H.Rept. 105-350, October 28, 1997, p. 30.  In the same year, House Committee on National
Security, also concerned that all costs of all aspects of programs were not being identified,
directed that future CBJBs show “all direct and associated costs, in each budget category
(e.g. procurement, research and development, operations and maintenance, military
construction, etc.)....”  U.S. Congress, 105th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
H.Rept. 105-132, June 16, 1997, p. 304.  A year later, HPSCI noted good progress by the
IC in preparing submissions for FY1999, but asked for additional data.  H.Rept. 105-508,
p. 16.
to be  forwarded to intelligence committees along with armed services and
appropriations committees. Justification materials on national programs are
submitted to the two intelligence committees along with classified CBJBs, which
include one volume for each NFIP program plus an additional summary volume.  The
classified books, available to Members and committee staff, include explanatory
narrative and resource displays for all resources requested by the program.  Also
included are descriptions of base levels of efforts, ongoing initiatives and new
initiatives with associated resource displays.  CBJBs are submitted to Congress
within a few weeks of the delivery of the budget in early February and form the basis
for the committees’ review of the entire NFIP prior to the drafting of annual
intelligence authorization bills.  Once the intelligence committees complete their
review — generally in the spring and early summer — the legislation is referred to
the armed services committee which have the option of submitting a separate report
prior to floor consideration.
Classified budget justification books, provided by the Administration to
Congress, are the primary ways, in addition to oral testimony, by which Congress
obtains information about intelligence programs.  In 1997 HPSCI criticized
justification books for lacking “several critical components necessary for the
Committee to ensure proper alignment of funding within the funding appropriations
categories.  Clear identification of each project; its specific budget request numbers;
the appropriation category (e.g., Other Procurement, Defense-wide; RDT&E, Navy,
etc.); the budget request line number, and if a research and development project, the
Program Element number [are] essential to this task....  Therefore, the Committee
directs the CMS [Community Management Staff] and the Defense Department to
provide this specific data in all future budget justification documents.”15
In 2000, HPSCI expressed its continued frustration with a perceived lack of
detail provided in justification books (which are classified) and strongly criticized
financial management practices at some NFIP agencies.  HPSCI stated that:
... the NFIP agencies need greater insight into their financial obligations and the
capabilities that they are developing.  NSA’s baseline activity, for example,
identified many areas of duplicative development, as well as lack of investment
in key strategic areas.  Yet, due to the lack of detail, the CBJB did not provide
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16 H.Rept. 106-620, p. 24.
17 H.Rept. 108-163, p. 25.
18 Section 504(a)(1) of the National Security Act requires that funds for intelligence
activities be “specifically authorized by the Congress.”  Intelligence authorization acts
(including their classified annexes) provide specific authorization, although appropriations
acts also usually have generalized language providing specific authorization to meet the
504(a)(1) requirement.  (The inclusion of such provisions in appropriations acts serves as
authorization until authorization bills are enacted or in the absence of authorization bills as
often occurs when supplemental appropriations bills are enacted.)  Even when authorization
legislation is under consideration the two appropriations committees also review intelligence
budget submissions and intelligence funds for most intelligence activities are included in
annual defense appropriation bills.  Supplemental appropriations that fund intelligence
activities include an authorizing provision to comply with section 504 of the National
Security Act, but they are not reported by the two intelligence committees.  
19 During floor consideration of the FY2004 intelligence authorization bill, Representative
Hastings, a member of HPSCI, stated: “it is important to note that this bill authorizes only
part of the operating funds for the intelligence community.  A huge portion of intelligence
funds were provided in the $87 billion Iraqi counterterrorism supplemental and in the
supplementals that proceeded it.”  Congressional Record, November 20, 2003, p. H11674.
this information.  The Committee notes that, at least at some agencies, internal
financial management practices seriously complicate this process....16
In 2003, HPSCI again called attention to limitations in the data included in
CBJBs which is often less extensive than that routinely provided in DOD budget
materials:  
The Committee believes, for example, that acquisition program details in the CBJBs
should include major milestones and deliverables for contracted projects for the
entire length of a contract and contain more specificity for the budget year of the
request.  Many of the project milestones in the CBJBs are, however, at such a high-
level that the Committee is unable to determine the stage of the development activity
or what will be accomplished in the coming year.  The project descriptions are often
so vague that the Committee is unable to determine the value of, or even what is
being developed.17
Supplemental Appropriations  
While procedures for annual budget submissions have long been followed, there
has been an increasing practice in recent years, and especially since the September
11, 2001 attacks, to provide intelligence funding in supplemental appropriations
acts.18  Of the $165.6 billion in supplemental appropriations that the Defense
Department has received since September 2001, a significant, but not publicly
identified, portion of these sums — at least $16 billion (not counting funds received
in the FY2004 Iraq supplemental) — was directed at intelligence and intelligence-
related activities.19 
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20 U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept.
107-592, July 18, 2002, p. 15.
21 H.Rept. 108-163, p. 22.
Arguably, there is less opportunity for consideration of proposed supplemental
intelligence spending within the context of established programs.  The HPSCI noted
in July 2002:
The “advantage” of the supplemental process to the Intelligence
Community is that pressing budgetary demands can be met in a shorter time (and
with fewer bureaucratic hurdles) than the regular yearly process.  However, by
continuing to rely on supplemental appropriations year after year, the Intelligence
Community risks fostering a budget process that is ripe for abuse and long-term
funding gaps.
The House Committee also argued that the Defense Emergency Response Fund
(DERF) (a funding initiative that permits DOD to shift funds from a central fund to
specific appropriations accounts after enactment as required for counterterrorist
operations) “has turned into just another vehicle to fund items that the Intelligence
Community did not get through the regular budget and planning process.”20  In
particular, it is argued, supplemental legislation can undercut established budgeting
and congressional oversight procedures making it more difficult to weigh trade-offs
and adjust overall priorities.  It can, in some situations, lead to the launching of
programs that are unlikely to be sustained in the regular authorization and
appropriation process.  
Some question the propriety of funding “core” programs in emergency
supplemental legislation which are intended to provide for additional unforeseen
needs resulting from combat and occupation duties.  In June 2003, HPSCI reiterated
its concerns, regretting that “core mission and core mission support programs have
also been funded in supplemental appropriations.”  It argued that, “The repeated
reliance on supplemental appropriations has an erosive negative effect on planning,
and impedes long-term, strategic planning.  The Committee hopes that the IC has
finally reached a plateau of resources and capabilities on which long-term strategic
planning can now begin.”
Further, HPSCI concluded:
The Committee cannot help but note that budgeting by supplemental
consequentially limits congressional oversight.  The Committee strongly believes
that the health of the IC is directly related to the oversight from Congress it
receives. Certainly, the confidence of the American people activities, and
programs of the IC is increased significantly as a result of the transparency that
exists between the IC and its congressional overseers.21
Concern in not limited to the House Committee.  In its report on a FY2005
Intelligence Authorization bill (S. 2386) the Senate Intelligence Committee argued,
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22 U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, To
Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related
Activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept.
108-258, May 5, 2004, p. 10.
23 50 USC 414(a)(3).
24 H.Rept. 106-620, p. 25. 
25 U.S. Congress, 106th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001 for the Intelligence Activities of the United
States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System,
S.Rept. 106-279, May 4, 2000, p. 33.
26 Congressional Record, November 21, 2003, pp.S15354-15355.
“While the practice of funding baseline expenditures using supplemental vehicles has
become more prevalent in the past 10 years, ... it is time to rein in this practice.”22
Reprogramming Issues
A concern for some observers of the Intelligence Community are the current
procedures for reprogramming of previously appropriated funds.  Reprogrammings
are intended to permit shifting funds to meet unanticipated new requirements that
arise during the course the year.  The National Security Act permits the DCI to
transfer funds appropriated for one program within NFIP to another program within
NFIP.  Such transfers are subject to a number of conditions: they must be approved
by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the receiving activity must
be of a higher priority than the one from which funds are taken, the transfer must be
based on unforeseen requirements, and the head of the department from which funds
are transferred must not object.  In addition, appropriate congressional committees
must be notified.23  Procedures for reprogramming, while seemingly esoteric, ensure
that congressional directions are followed in the expenditure of funds.
There are, however, congressional concerns that reprogramming procedures
have not invariably met statutory conditional requirements.  In May 2000, the House
Intelligence Committee complained about “significant and deleterious movements
of money” from field stations to CIA Headquarters that were inconsistent with
National Security Act provisions and asked the CIA Inspector General to investigate
whether statutory provisions were being followed.24  Similar concerns were expressed
by the Senate Intelligence Committee: “Recent actions, including taxing directorates
for funds to be used in other areas, and moving funds within expenditure centers
without congressional notification, have eroded this Committee’s confidence that
appropriations are used as intended.”25  During floor consideration of the FY2004
intelligence authorization conference report, Senator Roberts, Chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, commented on “difficulties in the out years as the National
Foreign Intelligence Program becomes burdened with content that is more costly than
the budgeted funding.  This underestimation of future costs has resulted in significant
re-shuffling of NFIP funds to meet emerging shortfalls.”26  
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27 U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, Senate, To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2003 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 107-149, May 9, 2002, p. 9.
28 Recommendations of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, December 10, 2002, p. 1.
29  Ibid. Legislation has been introduced in the 108th Congress with the intention of
strengthening the coordination of intelligence activities (in addition to S. 1520, H.R. 4104,
H.R. 4584, S. 190, and S. 6); a detailed analysis of these bills lies beyond the scope of this
Report.  
30 Larry C. Kindsvater, “The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community,” Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2003.  This recommendation was echoed by former DCI Robert
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Congress has also criticized the process for reprogramming funds between NFIP
programs and non-NFIP programs..  In May 2002, the Senate Intelligence Committee
expressed concern that “the correspondence it receives notifying it of the
reprogramming of funds from one activity to another often does not set forth clearly
how the ... requirements of ‘higher priority’ and ‘unforeseen’ circumstances have
been satisfied.”  Section 305 of the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act “clarifies
the ‘unforeseen’ requirement by stating that such a requirement does not include the
failure of the Director of Central Intelligence to anticipate an action by Congress,
such as an authorization or appropriation level lower than that requested in the
President’s budget.”27   The provision was not, however, included in the version of
the bill that was enacted as P.L. 107-306.  Section 311 of the Senate version of the
FTY2004 intelligence authorization bill would have deleted the “unforeseen
requirements” criterion altogether, but the provision was not adopted in conference.
A Need for Comprehensive Reorganization?  
Some believe that major restructuring of the Intelligence Community may be
required if certain challenges in ISR efforts are to be addressed effectively.  The 2002
Joint Inquiry conducted by the two intelligence committees to review the background
of the 9/11 attacks recommended the establishment of a position of Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) who would have “the full range of management,
budgetary and personnel requirements needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence
Community operate as a coherent whole.”28 Some Members and the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)
have also recommended establishing a position of National Intelligence Director
(NID) to oversee national programs, but not joint military or tactical intelligence
programs which would managed solely by DOD.  Proposals to strengthen the overall
role of the DCI (or a DNI/NID) in managing the Intelligence Community with greater
authorities to execute budgets and transfer funds and personnel among agencies are
also under active consideration.29  Furthermore, a senior Intelligence Community
official, Larry Kindsvater, the DCI’s Executive Director for Intelligence Community
Affairs, has argued the need to reorganize the Intelligence Community, and proposed,
among other things, to give the DCI authority to transfer funding across agencies
with congressional approval.30 
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Such proposals could reduce the problems inherent in coordination among
separate agencies and might facilitate a more coherent approach to ISR acquisition.
Yet, any effort to create a DNI or strengthen the statutory authorities of the DCI
would probably be strongly opposed by DOD.  The military services would
undoubtedly insist on the need to manage the ISR systems that directly support their
operating forces, and argue that it would be  extremely unlikely that an entity separate
from DOD could efficiently manage the acquisition of ISR systems of this type.  
Many observers believe that there will  be a continuing need for organizational
arrangements that permit overlapping use of national and tactical systems — and the
complex bureaucratic arrangements that such overlapping use entails.  It is possible
to envision technologies that would someday permit separate systems for national
and tactical consumers without unacceptable costs in the same way that desktop
computers made large mainframes much less preferable for certain functions, but, for
the foreseeable future, such technologies are unlikely to be available, and intelligence
consumers will have to share access to many ISR systems.  Differing requirements
of separate agencies will have to be accommodated in designing and operating ISR
systems.  As a result, it appears likely that there will be a continuing need for a
complex structure of ISR coordination.  The question for many in Congress is how
to find ways to improve existing coordinate mechanisms which they believe have
been unsatisfactory. Any reorganization effort will, however, have to take into
account the complicated relationships that govern the acquisition of ISR systems.
Multiple Types of ISR Programs
One argument used by those proposing a major reorganization of intelligence
programming and budgeting is that the different categories of intelligence programs
are obsolete in today’s complex technological and threat environment.  ISR programs
are currently grouped into three major categories — the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).31  The three categories of intelligence
activities used in programming and budgeting are based on the different consumer
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NFIP Programs Serve National Decisionmaking
NFIP is defined in statute as:
All programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as
any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the head of a United States department or
agency or by the President.  Such term does not include programs, projects, or
activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the
planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed
Forces.33
NFIP is usually described as consisting of programs to support national
decisionmakers, especially the President, the National Security Council (NSC) staff,
and heads of cabinet departments, especially the Secretaries of State and Defense.
Major NFIP programs include:
! Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP)
! General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)
! Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)
! National Geospatial-Intelligence Program [formerly the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP)]
! National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
! DOD Foreign Counterintelligence Program34 (FCIP)
NFIP encompasses more than half of overall intelligence spending and includes
most efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC) — the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) [formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA)], and the National Security Agency (NSA). The DCI has overall
responsibility for preparing NFIP budget submissions based on input from DOD
agencies that have NFIP responsibilities.  NFIP budget totals are authorized in annual
intelligence authorization acts; total amounts are specified in the classified schedule
that accompany appropriations legislation, but are not made public.35 
CRS-13
35 (...continued)
accounts is, however, made public.
36 U.S. Congress, 104th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, H.Rept.
104-138, Part 1, June 14, 1995, pp. 10-11.
37 U.S. Congress, 106th Congress, 2d session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.Rept.
106-620, May 16, 2000.
38 U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, H.Rept.
108-163, June 18, 2003, p. 16.
39 H.Rept. 106-620, pp. 35-39.
JMIP Programs Serve the Defense Department  
The JMIP was established in 1995 to include defense-wide efforts that provide
support to multiple defense consumers.  There are four principal components to the
JMIP: 
! the Defense Cryptologic Program designed to provide cryptologic
support to military commands; 
! the Defense Imagery Program designed to provide imagery support
to military commands;
! the Defense Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Program;
! the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program that
includes sub-programs managed by DIA and other agencies in
support of DOD commands.36  
In its report on the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization act, the House Intelligence
Committee described a number of JMIP programs in the year 2000, including
modifications to reconnaissance aircraft, Global Hawk UAVs, and antenna systems
for reconnaissance aircraft.37
TIARA Programs Serve the Military Services
TIARA programs are “a diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition
programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide
direct information support to military operations.”38  In the year 2000 the House
Intelligence Committee described a number of TIARA programs — cryptologic and
language skills training for the Army, an Army ground station to use with the
JSTARS aircraft, funds for extending naval space surveillance, hyper spectral sensing
systems on Air Force UAVs, and a tactical video system for Special Operations
Forces.39  An annual list of TIARA programs is not published, although some are
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indicated in appropriations reports.40  Unlike JMIP programs which tend to be
completely intelligence systems, TIARA includes “related activities,” systems that
are essentially parts of various weapons systems (and that can be reclassified out of
TIARA).
Over a number of years it has become apparent that, to consumers of
intelligence, distinctions among NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA programs are becoming
indistinct.  As the Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide noted, “As systems grow
in complexity and capability and methods become more sophisticated, increasing
numbers of intelligence assets are capable of simultaneously serving both national
and tactical purposes.”41  For example, there has been for a number of years a
program, known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), which
is designed to facilitate the use of satellite imagery and other NFIP products by
military commanders.  In some military engagements with important diplomatic and
political implications, low-level tactical intelligence acquired through TIARA
systems is also desired by senior officials to support their efforts at crisis
management.  
As a result, observers argue that the three categories of ISR programs cannot be
meaningfully considered by themselves; they must be considered as parts of a greater
whole and, accordingly, the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA categories are outmoded.
However, changing the statutes, regulations, and rules which established the three
categories obviously would be difficult and would affect organizational relationships
in both executive and legislative branches.   One result of abolishing the system could
mean a devolution of acquisition to a multitude of program managers throughout the
military services — an approach that most observers would argue could have major
drawbacks. 
Another alternative to current procedures would be to give the DCI significantly
greater responsibility for the preparation and execution of ISR programs (NFIP and
TIARA) in order to avoid overlap — an approach that could dilute the influence of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in acquiring ISR systems that are
closely tied to military operational capabilities.  Proponents of any effort to revise
these procedures would undoubtedly be pressed to demonstrate that a new approach
could overcome the limitations of existing procedures.
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ISR Programming and Budgeting Procedures Differ
Among Agencies
Programming and budgeting of ISR systems are managed by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and its many components, and by the Intelligence Community
(through the office responsible to the DCI for inter-agency coordination, the
Community Management Staff (CMS)). The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) also plays a critical role in allocating budgetary goals that can constrain
intelligence spending proposals.  Congressional responsibilities are spread among
armed services, intelligence, appropriations, and other committees.  Although it
would be easy to question the number of entities involved, the reality is that the
overlap results from the evolution of a multiplicity of systems and the variety of
consumers.  Whereas NASA can singlehandedly manage a moon probe, no
intelligence agency will ordinarily by itself collect, analyze, and disseminate finished
intelligence.  Different procedures used for different ISR systems by different
agencies can also complicate efforts to achieve compatibility and maximize
effectiveness.   
Role of the DCI
While the DCI is responsible for presenting the NFIP budget, he has only an
advisory role for JMIP and TIARA.  Responsibilities for ISR programs are set forth
in law and regulations.  The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that
the DCI shall:
(1) facilitate the development of an annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States by — 
(A) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program; and
(B) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the
annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities Program....42
The act also provides that the DCI “shall provide guidance to elements of the
intelligence community for the preparation of their annual budgets and shall approve
such budgets before their incorporation in the National Foreign Intelligence
Program.”43
In recent years, the CIA budget — the only part of the NFIP managed solely by
the DCI — is comprised mainly of personnel expenses — the salaries of case
officers, assets, analysts, managers, etc. along with associated costs for equipment,
buildings and grounds. In the past, the CIA was also involved in significant
procurement efforts such as reconnaissance satellites, manned aircraft such as the U-
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2, and UAVs44.  The CIAP is managed by the Executive Director of the CIA, a senior
staff official at CIA; other agencies play a relatively minor role in CIA acquisition
efforts.
Role of the Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense has a major role in developing programs to address
DOD’s intelligence needs and in managing most NFIP programs.  The National
Security Act assigns to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility to ensure, in
consultation with the DCI, that:
(1) the budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the
Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of
the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and,
wherever such elements are performing government-wide functions, the needs
of other departments and agencies;
(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of
the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department of Defense
within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of the Department of Defense
complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under the National
Foreign Intelligence Program....45
Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, requires the
DCI, together with the Secretary of Defense, “to ensure that there is no unnecessary
overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense
intelligence programs....”46  There are, in addition, a number of inter-agency
agreements within the executive branch that govern the coordination of intelligence
programs and budget processes.47  
Most NFIP programs are managed by the Defense Department.  National
programs managed by DOD are gathered into several intelligence program categories
 — the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Consolidated Cryptologic
Program (CCP), the DOD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), the National
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Geospatial-Intelligence Program [formerly, the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency Program (NIMAP), and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).48
In some cases, a single agency within DOD manages one program; in other
cases responsibility is shared.  The CCP is managed by NSA.  The GDIP largely
covers the work of DIA; the CCP is implemented by NSA; geospatial intelligence is
the responsibility of the NGA, the NRP is the responsibility of the NRO, and
specialized programs are found in various agencies and offices.  Counterintelligence
(FCIP) is a responsibility of all agencies.  Satellites and sigint — responsibilities of
the NRO, NGA, and NSA — are the largest ISR programs and constitute a very
sizable portion of the estimated $40 billion in annual intelligence spending.
Changes in DOD’s Management of ISR. Overall coordination of these
programs within DOD was the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (C3I); but in May 2003
these functions were transferred to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
a newly created post headed by Stephen Cambone, a longtime associate of Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld.  The USD(I) is granted authority to “lead departmental activities
in programmatic processes related to intelligence and intelligence-related programs,
including, but not limited to, program change proposals, program evaluations,
assessments, and recommendations.”49  
Cambone has noted that making decisions on ISR programs early in the process
could have major implications for years ahead: “There are a lot of efforts, I think
perhaps more than some people appreciate, that are either early in their development
or just beginning or are envisioned over the next 18 months or so where a choice
between spending the dollar in one direction or another could have a big payoff
downstream.”50  The ultimate role of Cambone and his successors may not be fully
determined as yet, but the establishment of his office appears to reflect a more
centralized and coordinated approach to ISR acquisition.
How ISR Funding is Included in DOD’s Budget.  Managing programs
involves planning for future acquisition, preparation of budget documents, and
monitoring expenditures.  Intelligence funds are programmed, budgeted, and
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with the Budget’s 050 National Defense Function (within Function 051, DOD
Budget, or Function 054 Defense-related Activities categories).  Funds for CIA are
included (“hidden”) in the DOD budget but, once appropriated, are transferred by
OMB directly to the DCI for execution.  Of the eleven major programs in DOD’s
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), most ISR funding is in Program 3,
Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, and Space.  Funding for other
programs, such as aircraft, may  include intelligence-related research and
development, training, and intelligence-related functions may be in other categories.
These major categories are,  in turn, divided into program elements (PEs) that can be
aggregated for different purposes, including the identification of intelligence efforts.
Slightly more than half of annual authorized intelligence spending is devoted
to the agencies that are part of the NFIP; the remainder goes to programs that are part
of JMIP and TIARA.  JMIP programs extend beyond one service and are included
in defense authorization and appropriations bills.  Some JMIP programs are the
responsibility of a single defense agency while others are managed by one service as
an “executive agent” for the rest of DOD. 
Funding for specific intelligence programs is included in the budgets of the
services and defense agencies.  This funding is largely hidden in appropriations
legislation although some RDT&E programs with special code names are known to
fund intelligence efforts.  Other funds are included in larger “pots” of money, such
as the appropriation account, “O&M Defensewide.”
TIARA programs are usually managed by a single service for its own forces.
One analyst describes TIARA as:
nothing more than a reporting concept.  It is a designation applied to
aggregations of programs, projects and activities in military Service budgets
that provide tactical-level intelligence and related support to military operations.
These aggregations comprise two types of assets, i.e., organic military
intelligence assets and funding for Service-specific tactical intelligence
programs.52
As a reporting concept, the TIARA category consists of a variety of programs that
may vary from year to year.  In some cases, it may be difficult to distinguish among
TIARA programs and other surveillance and targeting efforts that may not be
categorized as TIARA.  To complicate matters further, surveillance programs may
be characterized as TIARA one year but not necessarily the next.53
TIARA programs are perhaps the most challenging to review because they are
forwarded as part of budget requests from the three military departments.  They have
to be disaggregated and considered along with TIARA programs of the other
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services, a process that is not necessarily easy and one that the parent service may
believe to be an integral part of a favored weapons system.  Under such
circumstances, assessing trade-offs among intelligence programs can become
difficult.  Similarly, when a weapon system with a TIARA component is delayed or
cancelled, there can be significant implications for intelligence efforts that were
designed to be integrated with the delayed or cancelled effort. 
Internal DOD Coordinating Boards.  A number of steps have been taken
in the past to ensure an integrated approach to intelligence programs, whether NFIP,
JMIP, or TIARA.  An unusual DOD entity, the Expanded Defense Resources Board,
consisting not only of senior DOD military and civilian officials but also the DCI,
was established in the mid-1990s to provide a broader executive branch review.
Another interagency review entity is the Intelligence Program Review Group which
reviews issues, analyzes priorities, and studies funding alternatives at the staff level
prior to consideration by the Expanded Defense Resources Board.
Coordination Between DOD and the IC  
Different procedures used by the Defense Department and the Intelligence
Community in dealing with the diffuse efforts that are collectively part of the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence have long been a source of
concern to resource managers.  As noted in the Intelligence Resource Manager’s
Guide, by 1993 there was a perceived need to (a) depict intelligence capabilities and
associated resources, (b) ensure adequate levels of detail for program review and
analysis, (c) ensure that compatible processes were in place to support
decisionmaking.  “The time had come to tear down barriers that had made it difficult
to identify shortfalls and unwanted NFIP/TIARA duplication.”54
Accordingly, at congressional urging, the then-DCI, R. James Woolsey,
undertook a number of measures during his tenure (1993-1995) to ensure a
comprehensive review process by adjusting schedules to ensure that DOD and IC
milestones coincided and that there were joint TIARA/NFIP reviews and that a
“common budget framework” was established to make characterization of NFIP and
TIARA resources consistent.  The goal was “to allow resource managers to peer
across seams into all program, projects, and activities containing dollars and/or
manpower assets designed to meet the same or similar types of missions.”55  One goal
was to identify changes in one program that might have an unintended consequence,
e.g. eliminating a TIARA program to collect imagery by an airborne sensor might
lead to a requirement for additional, and more expensive, satellite coverage of the
area previously covered by reconnaissance aircraft. Implementation of this effort
began with the FY1995 budget and continues to be used.  Related changes involved
DOD, including the Expanded Defense Resources Board and the Intelligence
Program Review Group.  An interagency Mission Requirements Board was
established by the Community Management Staff to ensure that the national and
tactical needs of all consumers were addressed.
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The process is currently coordinated by DOD and CMS officials ranging from
the Secretary of Defense and DCI down to lower-level budget specialists.  The DCI
and the Secretary of Defense (represented by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence) are responsible for jointly deciding major issues (and negotiating any
percentage reductions that might be required to meet cuts ordered by the President
or OMB), while their respective staffs interact in defining issues and preparing
submissions to congressional committees.  In practice, some observers believe that
DOD has greater influence in the process given its size and the need to ensure that
the military services have the intelligence they need to meet their operational
responsibilities.56
Congressional Oversight of ISR Programs  
Procedures for congressional oversight of intelligence activities also affect the
acquisition of ISR resources.  On Capitol Hill, the NFIP is overseen by the two
congressional intelligence committees.  HPSCI’s  jurisdiction is specified in
programmatic terms. It has oversight over NFIP along with “intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of all other departments and agencies of the
Government, including the tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the Department of Defense.”57  Senate rules, on the other hand, focus on agencies;
SSCI has jurisdiction over the CIA, DIA, NSA, other DOD agencies and
subdivisions, and the intelligence activities of the State Department and the FBI.  A
crucial difference between the two chambers is the exclusion from SSCI’s
jurisdiction of “tactical military intelligence serving no national policymaking
function.”58  HPSCI oversees JMIP and TIARA programs, coordinating with the
House Armed Services Committee.  In practice, SSCI also has an opportunity to
provide comments on JMIP and TIARA programs to the Armed Services committee,
which has primary jurisdiction.  Both intelligence committees have sole jurisdiction
over budgets for the CIA, the CIA retirement system, and the Community
Management Staff. After committee review, all NFIP programs are included in
annual intelligence authorization legislation; NFIP programs are included as well as
national defense authorization bills.  
JMIP and TIARA programs are authorized by HPSCI and the House Armed
Services Committee.  As a result of differing jurisdictions of the two intelligence
committees, the Senate Armed Services Committees authorizes JMIP and TIARA
expenditures.  SSCI does not have authorizing authority over JMIP and TIARA, but
it reviews and analyzes the JMIP and TIARA budget request, and recommends
actions to the Armed Services Committee.  
Although the relationship between intelligence committees and armed services
committees is generally cooperative, in some instances their approaches have
differed.  The National Defense Authorization Act of FY1997 (P.L. 104-724)
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established the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) despite the
misgivings of Members of HPSCI.59  The position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence  was established by the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 107-314, section 901), not by an intelligence authorization act.  Similarly, it
was the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, section 921) that
changed the name of NIMA to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, not
intelligence authorization legislation.
Conclusion
Despite the existence of the coordinative mechanisms described above,
Congress has formally expressed its concerns that ISR is currently ill-coordinated.
In part, coordination difficulties derive from the challenges faced by large
governmental organizations in managing fast-moving technological developments.
In addition, U.S. post-cold war defense planning is evolving into new, and uncertain,
approaches to a wide variety of possible conflict situations.  This evolution may
make it even more difficult to reach consensus on ISR requirements in future years.
Some observers continue to believe that existing institutional arrangements in both
executive and legislative branches hinder efforts to achieve a more coherent
approach.
Some observers believe that the failure of existing arrangements to satisfy
congressional concerns about coordination results in significant measure from the
lower relative influence of the DCI and the Community Management Staff compared
with that of the Secretary of Defense and DOD.  The DCI is arguably at a
disadvantage in any dispute with DOD because of the latter’s size, influence, and
prestige.  Similarly, questions exist regarding the relative influence of intelligence
and Armed Services committees.  Although such concerns may reflect current
bureaucratic realities, they are not inherently determinative.   Congress could choose
to provide the DCI with additional powers to formulate and execute the intelligence
budget.  Contrarily, Congress could restrict the DCI’s role and give greater authority
to the Secretary of Defense and his subordinate, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. There will remain an unquestionable need to consider overall
requirements of the Intelligence Community which extend throughout the Defense
Department as well as other government departments dealing with national security
matters.  Some observers go so far as to argue that longstanding distinctions among
national, joint military, and tactical systems have outlived their usefulness and that
a more comprehensive approach should be attempted. Since these distinctions are
reflected in statutes, any major changes would require congressional action.
Even in the absence of major statutory changes, some observers believe better
coordinative mechanisms could be developed.  Admittedly, it would be almost
impossible to design analytical processes that would identify definitive options for
ISR systems readily acceptable to all interested parties. The diverse nature of the
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systems, the multiple customers for data, the number of intelligence agencies, and the
dynamics of ever-changing ISR technologies make a multi-year “roadmap” extremely
difficult. Yet, a more disciplined assessment of the potential advantages and
disadvantages of different ISR options could be required for review in the executive
branch and in congressional committees.
Given the potential for the need for future budgetary restraints on ISR programs,
with or without a new procedural framework, the acquisition of expensive new
systems will undoubtedly remain an especially complex challenge to government
decisionmakers.
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Appendix A:  A Case Study in ISR Acquisition:  The
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Global Hawk
UAVs
Efforts to procure a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and high altitude
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) serve as a case study that illustrates the dilemmas
involved in the acquisitions of intelligence platforms and systems.  Both of the these
expensive and technologically sophisticated platforms can support national
policymakers as well as military commanders. Each has strengths and limitations.60
While no serious observer would argue that U.S. ISR requirements could be met by
only one approach, many believe that there have been insufficient efforts to achieve
an appropriate mix that provides optimal collection capabilities while avoiding
unnecessary duplication or wasted resources.  
Satellite imagery has long been one of the most valuable tools of the intelligence
profession.  The need for to obtain accurate estimates of Soviet military forces in the
mid-1950s led the U.S., in order to avoid highly dangerous overflights by
conventional aircraft, to develop special planes that could fly at very high altitudes
and ultimately to build reconnaissance satellites that could identify small objects
from space.  Satellite imagery became the cornerstone of arms control efforts in the
Cold War and, coupled with the availability of precision guided munitions, became
the key to those post-Cold War defense tactics that rely on highly selective targeting
to destroy selected targets with minimal collateral damage.  
Satellite programs are among the most expensive intelligence efforts, with
individual satellites costing a billion dollars each.  The need to replace aging satellite
programs led the Intelligence Community in the mid-1990s to initiate the Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA) program that is intended to provide a greater number of
smaller satellites that can provide coverage of more regions for longer periods. FIA
has, however, received considerable criticism.  In 1998, the House Intelligence
Committee has concluded:
For several years, the committee has been concerned with the increasing
costs of several major National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) programs and the
NRP’s [National Reconnaissance Program through  which the NRO is funded]
growing share of the NFIP budget.  Not seeing any relief from the tight fiscal
environment, the committee has sought to find technological innovations and
managerial reforms in the NRP that could reduce costs.  This goal lay behind the
committee’s push to shift to larger numbers of smaller satellites, which the
committee thought also would provide better performance against hard targets,
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reduce satellite vulnerability, and help to counter foreign denial and deception
practices. 
. . . .
The committee, in summary, is not satisfied that all appropriate measures
have been taken to reduce or control costs in the NRP or to adequately measure
the cost-effectiveness of all overhead collection activities.  The committee
believes that the DCI needs to exercise much more knowledgeable and diligent
oversight of NRO programs, with an eye to freeing up funds for investment
elsewhere, wherever possible.  This oversight must extend from requirements
tradeoffs, to cost estimating, to acquisition oversight.  The DCI also needs to
acquire the expertise necessary to make tradeoffs across the major NFIP
programs.  The DCI can no longer afford to rely on the major program managers
to police their organizations and budgets.  The committee has recommended
additional funds for the DCI to accelerate the development of these capabilities.61
One media account in December 2002 reported that “The National Reconnaissance
Office’s next-generation spy satellites, known as Future Imagery Architecture, are
more than a year delayed and almost $3 billion over cost, spurring an internal
Pentagon debate about whether to proceed with the program at all, say people
familiar with the discussions.”62  Further criticism was voiced in May 2003 by a task
force established by the Defense Science Board which submitted a report finding that
“the FIA program under contract at the time of our review to be significantly
underfunded and technically flawed. The task force believes that the FIA program —
thus structured — is not executable.”63
The process of satellite procurement and the role of the DCI vis-a-vis DOD has
come under some criticism.  One former CIA official who worked with the NRO has
described “an incredibly inefficient requirements process,” and suggested that the
DCI’s role has been reduced to the detriment of the overall satellite reconnaissance
effort:
The process for deriving the requirements for the new imagery architecture (FIA)
took two years and makes the point about the DCI’s diminished power clear.
DoD and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) played key roles in
the FIA requirements process; now DoD essentially controls all major NRO
requirements.  The DCI and the CIA have let DoD significantly erode what
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should be the DCI’s major responsibility: the arbitration, consolidation, and
establishment of national intelligence requirements.64
FIA, whose satellites are expected to be launched beginning around 2008,
absorbs a major portion of the intelligence budget and reportedly continues to be
plagued with serious delays and management problems.65  According to one media
account, the program is more than a year behind schedule and is forcing a shift of
some $4 billion from other ISR programs.66Some observers have, accordingly,
suggested that many of the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites could be realized
by relying on less expensive, high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global
Hawk, which has recently become available for operational missions and has been
used during Operation Iraq Freedom.  Proponents of Global Hawks, which have been
estimated to cost some $57 million per unit, maintain that these vehicles could
provide a considerable portion of the imagery that could otherwise be obtainable by
satellites that cost many times that figure.67  
There are advantages and disadvantages to both satellites and UAVs (as well as
manned aircraft which can also be used advantageously in some circumstances).
Satellites have been considered invulnerable to attacks from all but the most
sophisticated adversary and can be launched from U.S. territory.68  They are in orbit
for years and can be shifted from target to target as needs change. On the other hand,
they are expensive and there are inevitably limited numbers in the U.S. inventory.
Global Hawks, on the other hand, can be launched when needed, and can be targeted
by local commanders.  They do not, however, have the capability to remain overhead
for lengthy periods (sometimes termed a “long-dwell capability”), and they may be
vulnerable to attack.  While inexpensive in comparison with satellites, they are far
too costly to be considered expendable, as is the case with some tactical UAVs.
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UAV acquisition has been as heavily criticized as FIA.   HPSCI, in particular,
has pointed out problems with Global Hawk procurement:
The Committee is very concerned about the management and cost growth
of the Global Hawk endurance UAV program....  [Because of Air Force-initiated
upgrades] a $10 million per copy Global Hawk platform has become at least a
$30-40 million aircraft, and the cost will increase substantially further as
additional and improved sensors, and corresponding power/payload upgrades, are
added.  In fact, the Air Force projects that the average total unit cost (including
all program costs) will exceed $75 million per copy.
... there is now an effort to flood the Global Hawk program with money, there are
ad hoc plans for rapid, major upgrades before requirements have been
established, and no sign of serious examination of where and how Global Hawk
fits into an overall collection architecture....  DoD has taken no serious steps to
be able to relay and process the huge amounts of data from Global Hawk, or to
process, exploit, and disseminate all the data that a fleet of 51 Global Hawks
with highly capable sensors will generate.69
Satellites are budgeted under NFIP and operated by the NRO; Global Hawk
UAVs, on the other hand, have been budgeted under JMIP and operated by Air Force
components of regional commands.  These separate paths have made the possibility
of potential trade-offs between space and UAV collection vastly more difficult.
Observers sense that current procedures to integrate intelligence acquisition efforts
have not led to a comprehensive assessment of major issues relating to satellite and
UAV programs.  If UAVs can do at least part of the work of satellites then, arguably,
considerable budgetary savings might be realized.  On the other hand, a failure to
take advantage of U.S. satellite technological superiority could limit intelligence-
gathering capabilities for decades to come and prompt the decline of an important
U.S. industry.
